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SHOW ME THE MONEY:
THE CEO PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE
AND THE QUEST FOR EFFECTIVE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION REFORM
Biagio Marino*
The CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule (“the Rule”) represents the latest
regulation designed to combat one of corporate governance’s most
polarizing issues: the meteoric rise of executive compensation and its
damaging effect on the income inequality gap in the United States. Adopted
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 2015, and
effective in 2018, the Rule comports with over eighty years of regulations
that have required public companies to disclose information about their pay
practices. The Rule now mandates further public disclosure by requiring
companies to reveal the ratio of their CEO’s compensation to the median
annual compensation of all other company workers.
Although a company’s board of directors determines compensation
levels, the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule embodies a renewed effort to
empower shareholders in the process. By requiring companies to disclose
more information about their pay practices, regulators believe that
shareholders will be in a better position to hold boards accountable for
awarding excessive compensation. However, given the limited results of
similar regulations, concerns have emerged regarding the disclosure
methods employed and whether the current corporate structure of board
empowerment will continue to inhibit shareholders from achieving this
regulation’s intended purpose.
This Note discusses past attempts to combat growing levels of executive
compensation, analyzes the role of both shareholders and directors in the
compensation-setting process, and discusses conflicting views concerning
shareholder-director power, the disclosure mechanism, and the pay-ratio
metric. Finally, this Note balances these views by proposing alterations to
the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule that preserve the long-standing
corporate structure, while also offering shareholders an accountability
mechanism to enhance the Rule’s intended results.

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2014, Villanova
University. I would like to thank Professor Caroline Gentile for her invaluable guidance and
aid, as well as my loving and supporting family.
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INTRODUCTION
Louis Brandeis coined the phrase, “Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”1 For decades,
regulators adhered to this principle in combating a growing national issue:
the tremendous rise of executive compensation, and its contribution to the
overwhelming income inequality gap in the United States.2 From the 1940s
into the early 1970s, most Americans experienced a broad increase in their
quality of living, as executives were compensated at levels proportionate to
other workers.3 However, the income gap began to widen in the 1970s, as
growth for middle- and lower-income families did not grow at similar levels
to high-income families.4 The growing compensation disparity between
executives and the rest of the working nation over the last fifty years has
only exacerbated the call for reform.5 While in 1965 the CEO-to-worker
compensation ratio was only 20 to 1, an Economic Policy Institute study
showed that in 2014, the ratio had grown to 303 to 1.6 Today, a Walmart
employee earning $9 per hour must work 1,036 hours to earn the same
salary that Walmart’s CEO earns in just one hour.7 Along with these
statistics, executive compensation has developed into a “hot-button issue”
largely due to the process in which it is determined, as well as public
instances of executive pay being uncorrelated with company or personal
performance.8 The most famous example includes the ousting of former
Disney president Michael Ovitz, who received a total of $140 million in pay
despite being employed for only fourteen months.9
Although a company’s board of directors determines compensation,
regulators have progressively focused on empowering shareholders in the
process by providing them with more information about a company’s pay

1. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1932).
2. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION 331–42 (4th ed. 2012); see also Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill:
The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 302
(2009) (“No corporate governance issue captures the imagination and frustration of the
American public and politicians more than executive compensation.”).
3. See CHAD STONE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, A GUIDE TO
STATISTICS ON HISTORICAL TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY (2016), http://www.cbpp.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov_1.pdf (“Incomes grew rapidly and at roughly the
same rate up and down the income ladder, roughly doubling in inflation-adjusted terms
between the late 1940s and early 1970s.”) [https://perma.cc/853K-N3X9].
4. See id.
5. See discussion infra Part I.C.
6. Press Release, Econ. Policy Inst., CEOs Made 303 Times More Than Typical
Workers in 2014 (June 22, 2015), http://www.epi.org/press/ceos-made-303-times-more-thantypical-workers-in-2014/ [https://perma.cc/4L2N-EB49].
7. See EXECUTIVE PAY WATCH, http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch2015# (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/4SW7-P8HP].
8. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy on Trial: International Perspective on
the Effectiveness of Increased Shareholder Power, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 10 (2008); see
also Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or
Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1182–83 (2004).
9. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 279 (Del. Ch. 2003).
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practices and levels.10 The latest example is the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule (“the Rule”).11
Adopted in August 2015, and effective in 2018, the final Rule requires
public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of their CEO to
the median compensation of the rest of their employees.12 The SEC
believes that this will provide shareholders with additional information
when exercising their say-on-pay votes.13 Implemented under the 2010
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer Protection Act14 (Dodd-Frank), say-onpay votes are nonbinding advisory shareholder votes to approve or
disapprove of the compensation paid to named executive officers.15
Despite increased regulations, executive pay has skyrocketed over the
last fifty years.16 Inadequate results have fostered concerns regarding the
federal government’s and the SEC’s methods in combating this evolving
issue. First, a question arises as to whether disclosure is a proper method to
aid shareholders and, if so, whether regulations such as the CEO Pay Ratio
Disclosure Rule are focusing on the “right” information to disclose.
Second, opposing groups debate whether the allocation of power between
shareholders and directors in corporate affairs is adequately structured to
facilitate shareholder activism in a way that allows them to adequately
rectify the pay-setting process.
Part I provides a background of the history of executive compensation,
including how it is determined, the role of directors and shareholders in the
process, a summary of past regulations, and the basic components of the
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule. Part II then analyzes the shareholderdirector power struggle, whether disclosure is an efficient technique to
combat this issue, and, specifically, whether the use of a “ratio” is a proper
disclosure metric. Lastly, Part III proposes alterations to the pay ratio and
compensation-setting process that affirm the necessary powers of the board
of directors and also provide shareholders with the mechanisms needed to
effectuate meaningful change.
I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION:
THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW
While many debate its cause and potential consequences for our nation,
there has been an undisputed and dramatic rise in executive compensation,
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No.
75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015).
12. See id.
13. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [hereinafter Pay Ratio Press Release]
[https://perma.cc/SEG7-78JD].
14. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
15. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute
Compensation as Required Under Dodd-Frank Act (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Say-on-Pay
Press Release], https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-25.htm [https://perma.cc/KX3AXLYD].
16. See infra Part I.B.
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and it has contributed to the income inequality gap in our nation.17 Part I.A
discusses the basics of executive compensation, including its structure, how
it is determined, and the power of shareholders in the process. Part I.B then
examines the history of executive compensation trends, including the shift
toward incentive-based compensation and the emergence of institutional
investors as potential “problem solvers.” Next, Part I.C discusses various
corrective executive compensation reforms adopted by the federal
government and the SEC. Finally, Part I.D outlines the basic components
of the CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule.
A. Determining Executive Compensation
Although the exact structure differs from company to company,
executive compensation generally refers to a manager’s total pay package,
including base salary, bonuses, stock grants,18 stock options,19 and other
financial benefits.20 In public corporations, the board of directors is
responsible for setting executive compensation packages on behalf of
shareholders.21 Generally, the board will form a compensation committee
composed of independent directors.22 In crafting compensation packages,
the committee relies on hired consultants and experts who provide them
with information on common pay practices.23 One ordinary practice
involves utilizing information from “peer groups,” which represent
companies that are similar in size, market reach, and other relevant
factors.24 Committees ordinarily use the pay practices and levels of these
peer groups as a benchmark when structuring their own compensation
packages.25 After the committee evaluates the company’s executives and
17. See Income Inequality Is America’s 21st Century Monster, VOICE REPORTER (May 6,
2011), http://voiceforthemembersslate.blogspot.com/2011/05/income-inequality-is-americas21st.html (citing reports suggesting that income inequality in the United States is worse than
in countries like Pakistan, Ethiopia, and the Ivory Coast) [https://perma.cc/A3M7-3GTB].
18. Stock grants are a specific number of shares in the company that executives
frequently receive at the beginning of the year. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 332.
19. Stock options are commonly known as “call” options. They refer to the right, but
not an obligation, to purchase a certain number of shares at a set price. Employees are
allowed to exercise this option within a certain period or on a specific date. Holders of stock
options typically want to exercise these options when the call price is below the market
price. See Employee Stock Option—ESO, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/e/eso.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P6LT-KTAU].
20. See Executive Compensation Resource Center:
Overview, SIFMA, http://
www.sifma.org/issues/regulatory-reform/executive-compensation/overview/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Z2RJ-X5S2].
21. See Matthew Farrell, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive
Compensation: The Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of
America Corp., 96 CORNELL L. REV. 169, 173 (2010).
22. See id. Generally, directors are “independent” if they are not current or former
employees of the company and have no other company affiliations. See id. at 173 n.17.
23. See id. at 173.
24. Penny Hersher, Ratcheting up CEO Pay—or Competing for Talent?, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/penny-herscher/ratcheting-up-ceopay---o_b_272218.html [https://perma.cc/6WEN-VFZU].
25. See Peter Whoriskey, Cozy Relationships and “Peer Benchmarking” Send CEOs’
Pay Soaring, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
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determines appropriate pay levels, the board reviews it and officially has the
final say.26 However, the board usually approves this package “as a routine
matter without much inquiry.”27
Directors acquire the authority to make corporate governance decisions,
such as setting executive compensation levels, from the Delaware Code.
Title 8, section 141 states that “[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.”28 This provides the board with tremendous discretion to control
corporations and make decisions independent from shareholders. Corporate
law provides shareholders with voting rights only in limited instances: (1)
electing the board of directors;29 (2) removing the directors;30 (3) voting on
charter amendments;31 and (4) voting on fundamental corporate changes,
such as a merger agreement32 or the sale of a certain amount of company
assets.33 Therefore, the only way for shareholders to currently exert any
influence on this issue is by removing directors who award excessive pay
packages.
First, shareholders may replace board members at the annual shareholder
meeting if another candidate obtains the plurality votes needed,34 unless a
bylaw or charter provision specifies otherwise.35 Nevertheless, only
candidates nominated by the board itself are included in the company’s
Shareholders nominating an alternate candidate
proxy materials.36

economy/cozy-relationships-and-peer-benchmarking-send-ceos-pay-soaring/2011/09/
22/gIQAgq8NJL_print.html (noting that “researchers have found that about 90 percent of
major U.S. companies expressly set their executive pay targets at or above the median of
their peer group”) [https://perma.cc/EC88-JZ46].
26. See Farrell, supra note 21, at 173.
27. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (1999).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016).
29. Id. § 211(b). This is done at an annual stockholder meeting on a date and time
specified in the corporation’s bylaws. See id.
30. Id. § 141(k). Unless specified differently in a corporation’s charter, shareholders
may remove any director, with or without cause, through a majority vote at an annual
shareholder meeting. See id.
31. Id. § 242(a). Shareholders may vote to amend provisions in the charter only after the
board of directors passes a resolution setting forth the proposed amendment. See id.
§ 242(b)(1).
32. Id. § 251(c). Shareholders may vote on merger agreements only after the board of
directors approves the merger, and the shareholders are not subject to the exceptions listed in
section 251(f). See id.
33. Id. § 271(a).
34. Id. § 216(3).
35. Altering the shareholder votes needed contrary to the plurality rule requires a charter
or bylaw provision pursuant to section 216 of the Delaware Code. See id.
36. See Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1305 (2013).
Proxy materials are “documents [that] are used to inform shareholders and solicit votes for
corporate decisions, such as the election of directors . . . . SEC regulations require a public
company to disclose specific information in its proxy materials, so that investors can be clear
on the procedures to follow in certain circumstances.” Proxy Materials, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proxymaterials.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/EG35-4UZG].
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therefore bear the costs of independent proxy solicitations.37 If the board is
staggered,38 shareholders may not replace a director who is not up for
election at the annual shareholder meeting.39 Second, any director may be
removed with or without cause by a majority shareholder vote.40 However,
directors on a staggered board may be removed only for cause.41
Subject to various limitations, shareholders may submit rule proposals on
issues such as executive compensation, which are then required to be voted
on under SEC Rule 14a-8.42 When voting on these proposals, or those
submitted by managers or other shareholders, votes are required in the form
of either approval or rejection without allowing for commentary or
suggestions.43
B. More Money, More Problems:
The Rise of Executive Compensation
and Performance-Based Pay
The last fifty years have witnessed the explosion of executive pay levels,
the evolution of incentive-based compensation44—including its failure to
link pay to performance—and its contribution to income inequality.
Overall, inflation-adjusted CEO compensation increased 997 percent from
1978 to 2014.45 Given that a typical worker’s annual compensation grew
by only 10.9 percent during the same period, it is apparent why public
scrutiny of this issue has increased.46 Despite the stock market’s decline by
roughly half between 1965 and 1978, CEO annual compensation still
increased by 78.7 percent.47 This general trend continued as CEO
compensation grew progressively in the 1980s, exploded in the 1990s, and
peaked in 2000.48

37. See Kang, supra note 36, at 1306–07. They must pay for proxy materials to be
mailed to shareholders. See id.
38. “If a staggered board is chosen, the directors shall be divided into two or three
classes as nearly equal in number as possible and one class shall be elected by ballot
annually.” 12 C.F.R. § 239.27(b) (2014).
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
40. Id. § 141(k).
41. Id. § 141(k)(1).
42. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
43. See Kang, supra note 36, at 1307.
44. Incentive-based compensation is synonymous with performance-based
compensation.
45. Alyssa Davis & Lawrence Mishel, CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers
Are Paid Less, ECON. POL’Y INST. 1, 3–4 (June 21, 2015), http://www.epi.org/files/2015/topceos-make-300-times-more-than-typical-workers.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6VD-9GB2].
46. See id.; see also David Owen, The Pay Problem: What’s to Be Done About C.E.O.
Compensation?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2009/10/12/the-pay-problem [https://perma.cc/MLC6-KNCK].
47. See Davis & Mishel, supra note 45, at 3–4.
48. See id.; Carola Frydman & Raven E. Saks, Executive Compensation: A New View
from a Long-Term Perspective, 1936–2005, at 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14145, 2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14145.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HHFYVUU].
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Up until the late 1980s, CEOs and other top executives were typically
compensated like all other employees in their companies.49 Their
compensation was comprised of an annual salary and a discretionary
bonus.50 Yet, despite decreases in company profits, most executive salaries
and bonuses continued to grow.51 Because CEOs and top executives
received large salaries regardless of corporate performance, compensation
structures at the time provided little incentive for them to expend maximum
effort to enhance shareholder profits, the primary goal of any business or
corporation.52 In response to increased public pressure to correlate
executive pay with performance, boards began compensating executives in
the form of stock grants and, to a greater extent, stock options.53 Boards
viewed these performance-based pay structures as a way to align the goals
of executives and shareholders, thereby mitigating agency problems.54 The
harder executives worked to maximize the profits of shareholders, the more
the stock grants and options awarded to them would be worth.55 While
only 30 percent of CEOs received stock option awards during the 1980s,
this number rose to roughly 70 percent by 1994.56 Nonetheless, incentivebased pay did little to alleviate, and may have even exacerbated, problems
of uncorrelated pay and performance. Surveys indicate that from 1991–
1993, CEOs at the largest U.S. corporations earned $2.4 million, $3.5
million, and $4.1 million in those respective years.57 By 2000, the average
CEO earned approximately $20 million,58 with large companies such as
Enron paying their top five executives a staggering total of
$282.7 million.59
After peaking in 2000, pay fluctuations occurred due to the rise and fall
of the stock market.60 After an initial decline in CEO pay in the early

49. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 331.
50. See id.
51. Graef S. Crystal, How Much CEOs Really Make, FORTUNE (June 17, 1991),
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1991/06/17/75159/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/C6L4-82MQ].
52. See Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced
Emphasis on Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1212–13
(1999).
53. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 332; see also Graef Crystal, CEOs and Incentives:
The Myth of “Pay-for-Performance,” L.A. TIMES (Jan. 8, 1995), http://articles.latimes.com/
1995-01-08/business/fi-17839_1_pay-package [https://perma.cc/CP5F-VTR9].
54. For a discussion on agency problems, see infra Part II.A.
55. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 653–54 (1998) (“If there is no meaningful link between
CEO pay and company performance, it is doubtful that the trillions of dollars of assets in
public corporations are being managed efficiently.”).
56. See id. at 663. Over this same period, the average value of a stock option grant rose
683 percent, from $155,000 to $1,200,000. See id. at 662.
57. See Marino, supra note 52, at 1210.
58. See Davis & Mishel, supra note 45, at 3.
59. See Dan Ackman, Pay Madness at Enron, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2002),
http://www.forbes.com/2002/03/22/0322enronpay.html [https://perma.cc/5WRC-2TUL].
60. See generally Rick Newman, The CEO “Pay Gap” Is Actually Narrowing, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/rick-
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2000s, pay levels bounced back in 2007.61 A similar recovery occurred in
2014 following the 2008 financial crisis.62 Although executive pay
currently remains below the peak levels of the early 2000s, it still remains
substantially higher than levels reported before the turn of the century.63
Furthermore, stock options still make up the largest component of the
average large company’s CEO pay package today.64
C. Disclosure-Related Executive Compensation Reforms
Part I.C.1 discusses the history and development of SEC regulations
designed to curb growing executive compensation levels. Part I.C.2 then
examines similar actions taken by the federal government.
1. SEC Regulations:
Securities Act, Exchange Act, and Subsequent Revisions
Since 1933, regulators have implemented the philosophy of disclosure in
most, if not all, executive compensation regulations. The SEC maintains
that it is not its duty to regulate and determine the “right” level of
compensation for executives but rather that this responsibility lies with the
compensation committee of the board of directors.65 Despite these
assertions, the SEC has enacted various regulations with the purpose of
“advanc[ing] the interests of shareholders through better disclosure.”66
Although they do not directly influence pay levels, shareholders may, in
theory, replace directors who they believe award excessive compensation
packages.67 Requiring companies to disclose information about executive

newman/2013/04/17/the-ceo-pay-gap-is-actually-narrowing (discussing how the pay gap
narrowed in the early 2000s but has since recovered) [https://perma.cc/8D2J-KXXA].
61. See Davis & Mishel, supra note 45, at 4.
62. See id. at 6 (noting that by 2014, the CEO-to-worker compensation ratio also
recovered to 303.4 to 1, a rise of 107.6 from 2009).
63. See id. Accompanying the tremendous rise of executive compensation has been the
development of institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds,
mutual funds, investment advisors, etc.) as shareholders. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277 (1991) (discussing the rise of institutional investors in the 1980s). While these
investors owned only 7 to 8 percent of U.S. corporations in 1950, by 2010 this level reached
67 percent, with many owning 2 to 3 percent of a single corporation. See Luis A. Aguilar,
Comm’r, SEC, Institutional Investors: Power and Responsibility, Speech at Georgia State
University (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13651715
15808 [https://perma.cc/GFR7-W7RU]. Today, institutional investors are responsible for
roughly 70 percent of the trading on the New York Stock Exchange within a given day.
Institutional Investors, BUSINESSDICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/
institutional-investors.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/W9VP-CCUS].
64. See David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 661
(2005).
65. Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman: Introductory Remarks
at the SEC Open Meeting (July 26, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/
spch072606cc.htm [https://perma.cc/6F34-QWBT].
66. Id.
67. See supra Part I.A.
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compensation levels therefore provides shareholders greater insight into the
decisions of these directors.
As one of the architects of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities
Act”), Felix Frankfurter stated that “[t]he existence of bonuses, of excessive
commissions and salaries . . . may all be open secrets among the knowing,
but the knowing are few.”68 Following the 1929 Great Depression, in
which thousands of employees were laid off, corporate executives increased
their salaries to compensate for a reduction in profit-based bonuses.69 In
response to the economic turmoil, Congress passed the Securities Act and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the Exchange Act”). Although both
addressed a multitude of issues, Congress hoped that its executive
compensation sections would shame executives into accepting lower pay.70
For example, section 14 of schedule A of the Securities Act requires public
companies to disclose the compensation of officers and directors for the
prior year and the year following an offering if such compensation exceeds
$25,000.71
The SEC expanded their regulations in 1938 by enacting the first
executive compensation disclosure rules for proxy statements.72 In 1942,
1952, 1978, and 1983, the SEC continuously revised several disclosure
requirements, including shifting disclosure from a tabular to a narrative
approach.73 Unlike the tabular approach, which requires companies to
disclose hard numbers, the narrative approach requires an explanation of a
However, the difficulty in comparing
company’s pay policies.74
compensation levels from year to year and company to company became an
obstacle under the narrative form.75 The SEC responded by significantly
revising its requirements in 1992 to combine both approaches.76 First, in an
effort to obtain more detailed information, the SEC established new rules
requiring companies to disclose the compensation of their CEO and top four
highest paid executives in tabular form.77 Second, the compensation
committee was required to describe and explain their compensation
decisions in narrative form.78 The purpose of these amendments was to
provide shareholders with knowledge of compensation forms, the method
68. Jerry W. Markham, Regulating Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 277, 284 (2007) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Securities Act—Social Consequences,
FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55).
69. See id. at 284–85.
70. See id. at 278 (commenting that the opposite effect occurred).
71. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(14) (2012).
72. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No. 54302A, Investment Company Act Release No.
27444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,160 n.44 (Sept. 8, 2006).
73. See Markham, supra note 68, at 285.
74. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,160.
75. See id. at 53,161.
76. See Markham, supra note 68, at 285.
77. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6962, Exchange
Act Release No. 31327, Investment Company Act Release No. 19032, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126,
48,127 (Oct. 21, 1992); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 335–36.
78. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,127; ALLEN ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 336.
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the board used in reaching their decisions, and the relationship between
corporate pay and performance.79
As more complex pay structures emerged, the SEC observed that the
1992 requirements failed to account for all of the elements of compensation
that companies began using.80 To rectify these failures, the SEC amended
the rules in 2006 by calling for companies to provide a single number
demonstrating the compensation for each of their top executives.81 They
additionally created the Executive Compensation Disclosure Rule, requiring
companies to disclose a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in
narrative form.82 The CD&A requires companies to give context to the
mandatory tabular disclosure of compensation numbers by also compelling
them to provide (1) the objectives of the compensation program, (2) an
explanation of what the compensation program is designed to reward, (3)
each element of compensation, (4) the rationale for using each element, (5)
how the company determines the amount of each element, and (6) how
these choices fit the compensation objectives as a whole.83 The SEC
believed that these modifications would be effective in adapting to a
continuously evolving marketplace.84
2. Federal Statutes to Curb Compensation
In recent years the federal government has joined the SEC’s mission by
enacting various statutes containing executive compensation provisions.
Although not focused solely on this issue, they include important
components that regulators believed would aid in curtailing high pay levels.
Part I.C.2.a discusses the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and Part I.C.2.b
outlines various provisions of Dodd-Frank.
a. Knock Your SOX Off
Congress passed SOX in July 200285 in response to various corporate and
accounting scandals that cost investors billions of dollars.86 Although it

79. See Executive Compensation Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. at 48,126.
80. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. at 53,160.
The rigid requirements of 1992 were incompatible with the emerging complexity of
compensation packages. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC, Speech By SEC Chairman:
Chairman’s Opening Statement; Proposed Revisions to the Executive Compensation and
Related Party Disclosure Rules (Jan. 17, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch011706cc.htm [https://perma.cc/586R-KXEE].
81. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 336.
82. See Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, Securities Act Release
No. 8655, Exchange Act Release No. 53185, Investment Company Act Release No. 27218,
71 Fed. Reg. 6,542, 6,545 (Feb. 8, 2006).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (b)(1)(i)–(vi) (2014).
84. See Cox, supra note 80 (noting that the rules were “out of date”).
85. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
86. See Linda Chatman Thomsen & Donna Norman, Sarbanes-Oxley Turns Six: An
Enforcement Perspective, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 393, 394 (2008) (“The story behind [SOX]
begins with the fraud at Enron Corporation, which led to its December 2001 filing of what
was then the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.”).
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focused mostly on auditing practices, it federalized provisions for forfeiting
executive pay.87 Section 304, commonly known as the “clawback”
provision, provides that if an issuer restates its financials due to excessive
misconduct, the CEO and CFO are required to pay back any bonuses
(incentive or equity-based), and trading profits earned in the twelve months
following the incorrect financial information.88
However section 304 does not specify what degree of misconduct is
necessary to trigger the regulation, it only governs the recoupment of
compensation paid to CEOs and CFOs, and it does not specify that the CEO
or CFO be involved in or have knowledge of the misconduct.89 This
ambiguity has generated criticisms that were highlighted most notably in
SEC v. Jenkins.90 Although the SEC admitted that the former chairman and
CEO of CSK Auto Corporation did not engage in personal misconduct, it
sought reimbursement of $4 million from him because he signed off on
fraudulent financial statements.91 Based on a plain language reading of the
statute, the District Court of Arizona held that a CEO could be liable for a
company’s fraudulent financial statements without committing any
misconduct or violating any securities law.92 In other words, section 304
imposes “vicarious strict liability” on CEOs and CFOs.93
b. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act
Congress augmented its response to executive compensation and income
disparity problems by passing Dodd-Frank in 2010.94 Dodd-Frank targets
four specific reforms aimed at providing greater transparency and
accountability on executive compensation:
clawbacks, say-on-pay,
compensation committee independence, and pay versus performance
disclosure.95

87. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 328.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012). The term “issuer” refers to the corporation issuing the
bonus.
89. See id.
90. 718 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Ariz. 2010).
91. See id. at 1072–73.
92. See id. at 1075 (“Applying these steps of statutory interpretation, the Court holds
that the text and structure of Section 304 require only the misconduct of the issuer, but do
not necessarily require the specific misconduct of the issuer’s CEO or CFO.”).
93. See Isaac U. Kimes, Unfettered Clawbacks—Why Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act Requires a Personal Misconduct Standard, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 797, 813 (2012).
94. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm’r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Remarks
Before the Forum for Corporate Directors (Mar. 22, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2011/spch032211klc.htm (“Dodd-Frank is more than ten times longer, and
mandates more than ten times the rulemakings and studies that [SOX] required.”)
[https://perma.cc/WSY2-AV9X].
95. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress
Should Stay out of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 734 (2013) (“Congress
made a deliberate determination that the financial crisis had exposed shareholders’ inability
to ensure management accountability.”).
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Section 954 clarified and added a more stringent clawback requirement
than SOX in three important ways. First, it extended the look-back period
from twelve months to three years.96 Second, it broadened the scope of
clawbacks beyond just the CEO and CFO to include any current or former
executive.97 Third, it clarified SOX’s ambiguity by mandating that
evidence of misconduct is no longer required.98 Therefore, incentive-based
compensation such as stock options can be recovered regardless of whether
executive misconduct was involved in a company’s material noncompliance
with financial reporting requirements.
Additionally, section 951 mandated the creation of say-on-pay, an
advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation.99 It currently
mandates that public companies must give their shareholders an advisory
vote—at least once every three years based on shareholder preference—to
approve or disapprove of the compensation paid to their CEOs and four
highest earning executives during the prior fiscal year.100 The mandate’s
primary purpose is to empower shareholders to hold executives accountable
for compensation schemes that they reject.101 However, Dodd-Frank
ensures that no shareholder vote is able to overrule decisions made by the
company or its board.102 In other words, none of the shareholder votes
carry mandatory force.103 Companies must instead only reveal the board’s
consideration of shareholder votes when making any decisions the
following year.104
Adopted to strengthen the objectivity of compensation committees,
section 952 now requires all publicly traded U.S. companies to comprise
their committees of directors who are independent.105 Boards must now
consider whether any directors (1) received any additional fees beyond just
director fees and (2) have any affiliations with the company or a related
subsidiary.106
Lastly, section 953 enhanced the 2006 SEC executive compensation
regulations by requiring companies to disclose the relationship between
executive compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the
company, taking into account changes in the value of shares of stock and

96. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-4 (2012).
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Id. § 78n-1. The SEC adopted Rule 14a-21(a) and other rules on January 25, 2011.
Say-on-Pay Press Release, supra note 15.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1).
101. See Fisch, supra note 95, at 734, 737.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(c)(1)–(3).
103. However, this does not prohibit shareholders from making their own proposals
through proxy materials. See id. § 78n-1(c)(4).
104. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 9178, Exchange Act Release No. 63768, 76 Fed.
Reg. 6010, 6016 (Feb. 2, 2011).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3.
106. See id. § 78j-3(a)(3).
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dividends.107 Section 953 additionally mandated the SEC to adopt the CEO
Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule.108
D. CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule
In accordance with their congressional mandate, the SEC adopted the
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule on August 18, 2015.109 Effective in 2018,
the final Rule requires public companies to (1) disclose the annual total
compensation of their CEO, (2) report the median of the annual total
compensation of all other employees, and (3) provide the ratio of the annual
total compensation of all employees to the annual total compensation of the
CEO.110 The SEC believes that this new regulation will strike an
appropriate balance that aids both companies and shareholders.111 First, it
asserts that the Rule will assist shareholders during their say-on-pay votes
because it provides them with additional information when evaluating a
CEO’s compensation.112 The SEC additionally maintains that the Rule
provides companies with sufficient flexibility in determining their pay
ratios that will reduce compliance costs.113
Companies subject to the Rule are permitted to select any date within the
final three months of their last fiscal year to determine its employee
population.114 Those defined as “employees” within the meaning of the
final Rule include U.S. and foreign employees, as well as part-time,
seasonal, and temporary employees.115 Companies are allowed to exclude
foreign employees from their median employee determination only under a
data privacy exception or a de minimis exception.116
The Rule does not require companies to use a specific methodology when
identifying the median of their employee population.117 Rather, companies
retain flexibility to calculate the median based on their particular structure
107. See id. § 78n(i).
108. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903–04 (2010).
109. Pay Ratio Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 9877, Exchange Act Release No.
75610, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,104, 50,104 (Aug. 18, 2015).
110. See id. at 50,104–05. This requirement does not apply to emerging growth
companies, smaller reporting companies, or foreign issuers. See id. at 50,108.
111. See Pay Ratio Press Release, supra note 13.
112. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,106 (asserting that the pay-ratio rule
will generate shareholder engagement in executive compensation issues because it provides
shareholders with a company-specific metric to evaluate the CEO’s compensation within the
context of the company).
113. See Pay Ratio Press Release, supra note 13.
114. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,119.
115. See id. at 50,116.
116. Under a data privacy exception, companies can exclude foreign employees when the
rule would violate the laws of the foreign country in which the non-U.S. employee works.
Under a de minimis exception, companies may do so if non-U.S. employees make up 5
percent or less of the company’s total employee population. See id. at 50,123–35.
117. See id. at 50,135. Companies may identify the median using their total employee
population or a statistical sampling of that population. See id. They may then calculate the
median through options such as annual total compensation or information derived from tax
and payroll records. See id. Companies also may apply a cost-of-living adjustment to the
compensation measure. See id.
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and business methods.118 They are required, however, to describe the
methodology that they use.119 Although the SEC recognized potential
complexities without a uniform procedure, it believed that providing
companies with flexibility would reduce costs while simultaneously
aligning the Rule with the goals of section 953(b) of Dodd-Frank.120
The final Rule defines “annual total compensation” to mean total
compensation for the last completed fiscal year in accordance with Item
402(c)(2)(x) of Regulation S-K.121 This includes compensation in the form
of salary, bonuses, stock awards and options, contributions to retirement
plans, and other contributions to personal benefits.122 Although Item
402(c)(2)(x) is ordinarily used for calculating the compensation of only
CEOs and other named executives, applying it to all other employees
ensures consistent results. In accordance with granting companies adequate
flexibility, the Rule allows for reasonable estimates in calculating any
element of total compensation.123
II. CONFLICTS WITHIN CONFLICT:
SEARCHING FOR THE RIGHT FORMULA
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DILEMMA
Recent executive compensation reforms have concentrated on
empowering shareholders through increased disclosure. While some view
enhanced shareholder power as a necessary solution for corporate
governance reform, others are wary of its dangerous deviation from longestablished corporate law principals. Part II.A begins with a discussion of
the principal-agent problem that is central to this schism among executive
compensation reformers. Part II.B then discusses conflicting positions
regarding the proper allocation of power between shareholders and the
board of directors. Part II.C addresses whether the SEC’s method of
enhancing disclosure is a proper means of empowering shareholders.
Lastly, assuming the benefits disclosure provides, Part II.D analyzes
whether the innovation of a “pay ratio” is a beneficial disclosure metric for
shareholders.
A. The Principal-Agent Problem
Various scholars commenting on rising executive pay agree with the
premise that “[a]ny discussion of executive compensation must proceed
118. Id. at 50,107 (“[The rule] permit[s] registrants to select a methodology for
identifying the median employee that was appropriate to the size and structure of their
business and the way they compensate employees.”).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 50,108. Item 402(c)(2)(x) requires companies to disclose extensive
information regarding their CEO’s and other named executive officers’ compensation. See
id. at 50,107.
122. See Stephen Miller, Determining CEO Pay Ratio Isn’t So Simple, SOC’Y HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/compensation/articles/
pages/ceo-pay-ratio.aspx [https://perma.cc/4B9Q-HFGV].
123. See Pay Ratio Disclosure, 80 Fed. Reg. at 50,107–08.
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against the background of the fundamental agency problem afflicting
management decision-making.”124 An agency relationship is one “that
arises when one person (‘a principal’) manifests assent to another person
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to
the principal’s control.”125 Therefore, agents have power to make decisions
that affect the principal so long as they are within the scope of their
delegated authority.126 In an ideal world, agents would always act and
make decisions that align with the goals of their principal. However, we
know that this is not always the case. Principals therefore incur agency
costs to assure that suboptimal decisions are not being made.127 The
principal may expend resources to monitor the agent or provide him or her
with certain incentives to assure conformity to his or her goals.128
In the context of corporations, shareholders are principals who delegate
authority to both directors and managers as their agents.129 Shareholders’
goals of maximizing profits and gaining positive investment returns have
dominated corporate America for decades.130 Nonetheless, because the
board is vested with the power to manage the corporation’s business and
affairs, shareholders are unable to ensure that day-to-day decisions are
made with this goal in mind.131 They therefore elect and hire directors and
managers who they believe will do so.132 Directors and managers would do
just that under an efficient model. However, as rational actors, we also
expect them to strive to maximize their own utility, sometimes to the
detriment of shareholder interests.133 Because managers do not have a
major ownership stake in the corporation, if any at all, they therefore bear
only a small fraction of the results from their self-interested decisions,
leaving shareholders to bear the majority of the consequences.134 This
creates a greater incentive for managers to pursue their own economic

124. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003).
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
126. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
127. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of
the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 654–55 (2005).
128. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).
129. See id. at 309 (defining the relationship between stockholders and managers of a
corporation as a “pure agency relationship”).
130. See Jia Lynn Yang, Maximizing Shareholder Value: The Goal That Changed
Corporate America, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/maximizing-shareholder-value-the-goal-that-changed-corporate-america/
2013/08/26/26e9ca8e-ed74-11e2-9008-61e94a7ea20d_story.html [https://perma.cc/S9XBMV3J].
131. See Mark Anson et al., Aligning the Interests of Agents and Owners: An Empirical
Examination of Executive Compensation, IVEY BUS. J. (May–June 2004),
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/publication/aligning-the-interests-of-agents-and-owners-anempirical-examination-of-executive-compensation/ [https://perma.cc/UT39-GZGJ].
132. See Jenson & Meckling, supra note 128, at 308–09.
133. See id. at 308.
134. See Anson et al., supra note 131.
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motives without considering the detrimental effects it may have on
shareholders.135
It is argued that this principal-agent dilemma is the cornerstone of
executive compensation problems.136 Two approaches, as well as their
shortcomings, have emerged to analyze this dilemma: the optimal
contracting approach and the managerial power approach. Under the
optimal contracting approach, boards strive to craft compensation packages
that minimize agency costs and create a tighter link between the goals of
shareholders and managers.137 Boards focus on developing compensation
structures that encourage managers to maximize the value of the company
and overall shareholder wealth.138 The emergence and modernization of
stock-option compensation was seen as a way to achieve this goal.139 Yet
not only did these compensation schemes fail to assuage agency concerns,
but perhaps unexpectedly they contributed to the rising levels of executive
compensation.140 Critics assert that their failures, and the limitations of the
optimal contracting approach, stem from the idea that something is
obstructing directors from negotiating at arm’s length with management
during the compensation-setting process.141 Although incentive-based
compensation may alleviate agency problems between shareholders and
managers, such problems may still exist among shareholders and
directors.142 Most directors serving on compensation committees have
previously held positions as executives at other companies.143 Because
these directors may therefore have goals more aligned with managers than
shareholders, they may be more inclined to award higher compensation
packages.144
The managerial power approach also highlights the failures of the
compensation-setting process by emphasizing the ability of managers to
influence their own compensation by “capturing” the board and extracting
rent.145 Corporate managers and executives generally have substantial

135. See id.
136. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002).
137. See id. at 753 n.4 (describing the optimal contracting approach “taken by an
important line of legal scholarship”).
138. See Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 704 (2005).
139. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 124, at 82; see also Paredes, supra note 138, at 704
(“The redesign of options . . . is the very kind of executive compensation innovation that the
optimal contracting approach anticipates.”).
140. See supra Part I.B.
141. See Jennifer S. Martin, The House of Mouse and Beyond: Assessing the SEC’s
Efforts to Regulate Executive Compensation, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 481, 486 (2007).
142. See generally Mary-Hunter Morris, The Price of Advice, 86 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
153 (2009) (discussing the diverging interests of shareholders and directors).
143. See id. at 164.
144. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 127, at 656.
145. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 136, at 786. Rents are the excess of pay obtained by
an executive through his power over what he or she would have obtained under optimal
contracting. See id. at 784–86.
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power.146 They are therefore in a superior position to garner the board’s
support and influence their own pay.147 Although directors may remove an
underperforming manager or CEO, directors have a tendency to defer to
their judgments when they are performing adequately.148 This approach
posits that the only limitations on compensation are “outrage costs and
constraints” based on how much scrutiny a compensation package is
expected to drawn from shareholders and the public.149 Directors will
avoid embarrassment or reputational harm by disapproving compensation
packages that may result in public backlash.150 Without this check,
managers would be able to exert unconstrained influence on directors to
provide them with the greatest compensation packages possible.
B. The Power Struggle Between Shareholders and Directors
The power struggle between shareholders and directors in corporate
governance affairs has emerged as a potential cause of ineffective executive
compensation reform. Shareholder primacists assert that the current
corporate structure inhibits shareholders from effectuating any positive
change on important issues and that the allocation of power should be
altered to reflect the rise of institutional investors as beneficial contributors
in corporate governance affairs. In contrast, director primacists affirm the
settled U.S. corporate law principle that decision-making authority is
properly vested in the board of directors.151 They justify this assertion
based on the director primacy theory and team production theory. This
section discusses these opposing positions.
1. Shareholder Democracy
and Institutional Investor Promise
The most fundamental argument advocating for enhanced shareholder
power is the contention that the current corporate structure hinders
shareholders’ ability to become influential contributors in corporate
affairs.152 Given the board’s broad managerial power, shareholders have
only two options when they disagree with director decisions: replace these
directors or veto those decisions that require a shareholder vote.153
Shareholders face obstacles when asserting both of these powers.154
146. See id. at 784.
147. See id. at 784–86.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 786.
150. See id.
151. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006) (arguing that the present regime of
limited shareholder voting is proper).
152. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 851–65 (2005).
153. See supra Part I.A.
154. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot,
59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003) (arguing that although shareholder power to replace directors is vital
to corporate governance, it is largely a myth).

2016]

THE CEO PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE

1373

The emergence of staggered boards has inhibited shareholders’ ability to
replace directors who they believe are not adequately making decisions that
maximize shareholder value.155 Under a “unitary board,” shareholders have
an opportunity to replace an entire board of directors during one election.156
When boards are staggered, shareholders must win two elections just to
obtain majority control.157 Additionally, shareholders wishing to repeal
these staggered boards have had little success due to the lack of response
from management.158 Shareholders wishing to nominate alternative
director candidates face substantial costs and difficulties because those who
run a proxy contest bear the costs of a director campaign themselves.159
Shareholder primacists also assert that the right to veto only major
corporate decisions initiated by the board does not comport with the goal of
maximizing company and shareholder value.160 The veto power ensures
that major changes will never be made to the detriment of the company and
its shareholders.161 Yet, because only the board can make corporate
governance proposals, this power becomes essentially useless when the
board prefers the status quo in spite of shareholders’ desire for change.162
Shareholders are therefore stuck until the board proposes something. Even
where both shareholders and directors agree that major changes are
necessary, the changes actually implemented will likely reflect board, rather
than shareholder, preference.163 Consequently, unless shareholders are
given power to initiate “rules-of-the-game decisions,” inefficient
governance arrangements will likely result.164 In sum, shareholder
primacists maintain that unless significant reforms to the corporate elections
process are undertaken, shareholders will be unable to replace a board of
directors whom they feel are constructing excessive compensation packages
or will be prevented from altering the company’s rules in a beneficial way.
Many corporate governance problems, including executive
compensation, exist due to dispersed ownership.165 As a company’s
ownership structure becomes composed of additional investors, it becomes
increasingly difficult for any particular shareholder to influence the

155. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 853.
156. See Bebchuk, supra note 154, at 44.
157. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 853.
158. See, e.g., id. at 853–56 (providing statistics showing that management generally does
not follow resolutions to repeal staggered boards).
159. See id. at 856.
160. See id. at 862–65; see also supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
161. See Bebchuk, supra note 152, at 862 (describing veto power as only a “negative”
power).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 862–64.
164. See generally id. (proposing reforms allowing shareholders to intervene in corporate
decisions and adopt “value-increasing governance arrangements that management
disfavors”).
165. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher
Financing Proposals for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 271 (2003)
(explaining how dispersed shareholders are in a poor position to remedy various corporate
issues).
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corporation in a profound way.166 This is due to both collective action and
rational apathy problems.167 The tremendous rise of institutional investors
within the last two decades has generated optimism for shareholder
primacists because they believe these investors will be able to overcome
these issues.168
Collective action problems emerge as soon as multiple shareholders
exist.169 Any single shareholder who expends money and resources to
monitor or coordinate changes in management typically incurs all of the
costs.170 Yet, all shareholders equally share any benefit that results from
his or her actions.171 The costs accompanying shareholder activism
therefore may not justify the potential benefits.172
Shareholders also face rational apathy problems.173 Shareholders lack
incentives to expend resources participating in corporate governance issues,
such as voting, to the extent that they believe that their vote will not be
pivotal in the outcome.174 When this sentiment exists, shareholders’
economic incentives are to remain passive.175 However, rational apathy
decreases as shareholder ownership increases because it raises the
likelihood that his or her vote will be decisive.176
Many scholars assert that the rise of institutional investors as
shareholders has the potential to overcome these issues because they have
greater capacity and incentive to participate in corporate governance issues,
such as executive compensation.177 Traditional institutional investors like
pension funds and mutual funds typically own larger amounts of stock than
individual investors.178 Depending on the circumstances, these stock
blocks may be large enough to give the institutional investors an incentive

166. See Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010).
167. See id. at 792 (“The wide dispersal of shareholders led to collective action problems
and apathy that made shareholder discipline of managers ineffective at best and almost
impossible at worst.”).
168. See Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans,
Executive Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 170 (2000)
(stating that institutional investors can and have shown the ability to be effective monitors).
169. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 454 (1991).
170. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 165, at 278.
171. See id.
172. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 154.
173. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 165, at 278.
174. See id.
175. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 155.
176. See id. at 154.
177. See, e.g., Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive
Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV. 41, 48–53
(2008) (providing statistics demonstrating that, despite their historic passivity, institutional
investors continue to show promise as potential monitors).
178. See Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 811,
834–35 (2003).
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to be active.179 Unlike individuals, they also have a greater ability to
coordinate with one another and overcome collective action problems.180
Other nontraditional institutions, such as hedge funds,181 have generated
shareholder activist optimism due to their unique ability to generate
Most notably, hedge fund
significant benefits for shareholders.182
managers have a greater incentive to obtain positive returns for shareholders
because managers’ pay is based on the performance of the company they
invest in.183 Furthermore, the organizational structure of hedge funds
allows them to positively impact overall shareholder wealth in a distinct
way.184 Hedge funds are devoid of the regulatory and practical barriers that
face mutual funds and the political pressures that confront pension funds.185
For example, tax law does not inhibit a hedge fund from obtaining overly
concentrated positions in a single company in the same manner as mutual
funds.186 Overall, hedge funds have generated renewed hope among
shareholder activists because they are more prepared to actively lobby for
calculated changes that increase shareholder returns.187
2. Director Primacy and Shareholder Empowerment Skeptics
In contrast to shareholder primacists, director primacists promote the
need for untethered board of director power in corporate governance affairs.
Part II.B.2.a discusses the director primacy model and Part II.B.2.b
analyzes team production theory. Then, Part II.B.2.c examines arguments
made by those skeptical of the potential benefits of institutional investor
prominence.

179. See id. at 835.
180. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 165, at 280.
181. Hedge funds are characterized as having four characteristics: “(1) they are pooled,
privately organized investment vehicles; (2) they are administered by professional
investment managers with performance-based compensation and significant investments in
the fund; (3) they are not widely available to the public; and (4) they operate outside of
securities regulation and registration requirements.” Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 53 J. FIN. 1729, 1735 (2008).
182. See id. at 1730 (finding that “hedge funds increasingly engage in a new form of
shareholder activism and monitoring that differs fundamentally from previous activist efforts
by other institutional investors”); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds
in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007)
(stating that “hedge fund activism is strategic and ex ante”).
183. See Brav et al., supra note 181, at 1735.
184. See id. at 1730 (noting that hedge funds “can hold highly concentrated positions in
small numbers of companies, and use leverage and derivatives to extend their reach”).
185. Kuang-Wei Chueh, Is Hedge Fund Activism New Hope for the Market?, 2008
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 724, 733–42.
186. See Brav et al., supra note 181, at 1734.
187. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58 (2011); see also Matteo Tonello, The
Activism of Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (May 29, 2014), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/05/29/the-activism-of-carl-icahnand-bill-ackman/ (“A study by eVestment documents a seven-fold increase in the assets
managed by [hedge funds] from $23 billion in 2002 to an estimated $166 billion in early
2014.”) [https://perma.cc/FSQ7-L7WW].
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a. Why Change History for Mystery?
Lying at the core of shareholder disempowerment theories is the director
primacy model, which advocates for a status quo concerning the allocation
of power between shareholders and directors.188 The crux of this model
rests on the belief that increased shareholder power “seems likely to disrupt
the very mechanism that makes the widely held public corporation
practicable: namely, the centralization of . . . decisionmaking authority in
the board of directors.”189 Given the various complexities and problems
accompanying large corporations, this model advocates for maintaining a
hierarchal structure with a centralized decision-making body.190 Moreover,
it posits that conferring centralized decision-making authority upon the
board is cheaper and more efficient.191 Increasing shareholder power
would therefore only hinder the corporation because the board of directors
requires considerable discretion.192 Unlike shareholder primacists who
urge for expanded voting rights, advocates of this theory hold that
shareholder voting should not be used as an assertion of power, but as a last
resort accountability device.193 While critics of the status quo assert that
allocating more voting power to shareholders serves as a better
accountability check, this model emphasizes the preservation of the current
structure by highlighting regulators’ lack of interference with it throughout
history.194
b. Team Production Theory
Similarly, team production theory stresses the value of a board member
as a “mediating hierarch.”195 Distinct from various other models, this
theory recognizes that other actors beyond just shareholders make firmspecific investments196 in the corporation.197 Because determining the
exact contribution of each individual actor is arduous, allocating profits
accordingly is a challenging endeavor. Prior agreements encourage
shirking, and ex post rewards create incentives for rent seeking.198 The
188. See Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 1735–36.
189. Id. at 1749.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1746.
192. See id. at 1749–50 (noting that increased shareholder power would inevitably shift
some portion of the board’s authority to the shareholders).
193. See id. at 1750.
194. See id. at 1750–51.
195. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 276–78 (1999).
196. Firm-specific investments are those that are difficult to recover once they are
committed to the project. See id. at 249.
197. See id. at 250; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital
Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J.
173, 188–97 (discussing various groups who make firm-specific investments).
198. See Blair & Stout, supra note 195, at 249. Shirking occurs because the costs of
doing so are born by all individuals, not just the shirker. See id. at 249 n.3. Rent seeking is
an inefficient situation where individuals are competing with each other to gain the greatest
amount of wealth from a fixed sum. See id. at 249 nn.3–4.
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need for an independent “mediating hierarch” becomes lucid when viewing
the public corporation through this lens. As a mediating hierarch, the board
is in the best position to decisively balance the interests of competing
stakeholders—executives, employees, creditors, and shareholders—to
improve the joint welfare of the entire firm beyond that of just
shareholders.199 In this capacity, the board functions in ways similar to
trustees.200 Given the potential for competing interests, the current
corporate structure allows boards to be isolated from various influences and
control.201 The current shareholder voting power is therefore proper
because it maintains the board’s power to balance competing interests
without one group (shareholders) exerting excessive influence.202
c. The Fallacy of Institutional Investor Promise
Despite the optimism expressed by shareholder primacists, many critics
remain wary of the potential consequences that may accompany the
emergence of institutional investors as shareholders.203 Two specific
concerns support this skepticism: the lack of incentive for institutional
investors to become active participants in corporate affairs and the potential
for inefficiencies due to their private interests.
As noted above, shareholders remain passive in corporate governance
issues due to collective action and rational apathy problems.204 While the
evolution of institutional shareholders provides a theoretical solution to
these problems, various findings support the belief that even the most active
institutional investors spend minimal time on corporate governance
issues.205 Although concentrated ownership alleviates some collective
action concerns, institutional investors still face free-riding and economiccost problems that limit activist incentives.206 Furthermore, playing an

199. See id. at 271. But see Usha Rodrigues, A Conflict Primacy Model of the Public
Board, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1051 (arguing that modern boards lack knowledge of all the
interests of a corporation’s constituents to balance them accordingly).
200. See Blair & Stout, supra note 195, at 253, 290–92 (noting that “boards exist not to
protect shareholders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the
members of the corporate ‘team’”).
201. See id. at 291–92.
202. See id. at 309–15.
203. See generally Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder
Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006) (arguing that the divergent interests of institutional
shareholders is a concern); P. Alexander Quimby, Addressing Corporate Short-Termism
Through Loyalty Shares, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2013) (suggesting that the rise of
institutional investors has accompanied the same practices that lead to financial crises).
204. See supra notes 169–76 and accompany text. For further discussion of collective
action and rational apathy problems, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 154.
205. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 151, at 1751 (citing evidence showing that
institutions rarely elected board of directors, coordinated activities, or submitted shareholder
proposals). But see supra notes 181–87 and accompanying text (describing and highlighting
studies demonstrating the unique motivation of hedge funds to actively participate in
corporate governance affairs).
206. See John C. Bogle, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual Funds & Investment Welfare,
1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 49–50 (2006); Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public
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active role may generate undesirable tension with the company.207 Even
though they may disagree with director or managerial decisions, large
investors will either support them or remain passive in order to maintain
valuable relationships.208 Doing so also allows them to uphold their
reputation within the business community.209 Remaining passive may
therefore represent a “win-win” situation from both an economic and
reputational standpoint.210
A second issue concerns institutional investor private interests and their
ability to exercise opportunistic behavior to the detriment of other
shareholders.211 When shareholders have similar agendas, it is more likely
that they will be able to coordinate together in furtherance of a common
goal.212 Nonetheless, modern shareholders come in many different
varieties and with different self-interests.213 While shareholders are
interested in enhancing overall shareholder value, they are also in a position
to promote their private agendas whenever they expect to reap returns that
outweigh the costs of doing so.214 For example, public and union pension
funds may favor proposals that further their special labor interests at the
expense of other shareholders.215
Furthermore, “short-termism”216 practices of institutional investors may
create further conflict between themselves and other shareholders and
stockholders.217 Because many institutional investors such as hedge and
mutual funds are concerned with short-term profitability, they are less likely
to promote long-term policies that concern other shareholders.218 These
short-term practices also collide with the objectives of corporate lawmakers
who provided shareholders with voting rights to aid in promoting the

Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2010) (acknowledging the reduction in
collective action problems).
207. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The Case for Reuniting
Ownership and Control, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 254, 277–78 (2004).
208. See id. at 278.
209. See id.
210. See Bogle, supra note 206, at 49–50 (“[P]assivity in governance may pay. Let
others undertake the hard work and costs of activism. If their efforts are successful, the
‘passive-ists’ . . . will not only reap the rewards . . . [but] will also increase their chances of
getting the . . . business of the activists.”).
211. See Anabtawi, supra note 203, at 565–66.
212. See id. at 575.
213. See generally id. at 579–93 (discussing five different divergences among
shareholders:
short-term and long-term shareholders, diversified and undiversified
shareholders, inside and outside shareholders, public and union pension funds and economic
shareholders, and hedge and unhedged shareholders).
214. See id. at 593.
215. See id. at 588–90.
216. Quimby, supra note 203, at 391. Short-termism is “the practice of short-term
investing by shareholders and short-term business decisions by directors and managers at the
expense of long-term corporate sustainability.” Id.
217. See id. at 391–96.
218. See Anabtawi, supra note 203, at 564 (“[T]he hedge fund is [therefore] likely to
favor policies . . . that produce short-term gains, even if a more patient investment
orientation would generate higher returns over the long term.”).
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company’s long-term future.219 Regardless, shareholder primacists argue
that even if institutional shareholders pursue their short-term interests, they
will be unable to garner the majority support that is needed.220 Yet, their
large size may still allow them to form coalitions or negotiate with
management from an influential power position.221
C. Is Disclosure the Cure?
Disclosure requirements have been an integral component of executive
compensation reforms dating back to the 1930s.222 The recently adopted
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule conforms to the SEC’s long-held belief that
“[a]n educated investing public ultimately provides the best defense against
fraud and costly mistakes.”223 Although most knowledge of executive
compensation derives from mandatory disclosure requirements, some argue
that disclosure embodies a “double-edged sword” because the transparency
it provides may actually contribute to rising executive pay.224 This section
analyzes both edges of this sword against the backdrop of eighty years of
rising executive compensation levels.
1. Benefits of Disclosure on Executive Compensation
Disclosure reforms began as an attempt to address the scarcity of
executive compensation information available to the public and investors in
the marketplace.225 Generally, regulators believe that markets operate more
efficiently when all parties are privy to the same information.226 In addition
to greater transparency and efficiency, other benefits of disclosure have
been acknowledged.227 First, it assists shareholders in reducing the costs to
become informed, thereby making it easier for them to actively participate
in corporate governance affairs.228 This counteracts rational apathy
problems that would exist if shareholders needed to expend resources to
219. See Quimby, supra note 203, at 397.
220. See Anabtawi, supra note 203, at 594.
221. See id. at 596–97.
222. See generally Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The
Fight over Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 707 (2010)
(stating that information regarding executive compensation pay practices was rarely
available to the public or shareholders prior to the 1930s).
223. See SEC, 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 5 (2005),
https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/EX5D-DNYV].
224. Walker, supra note 64, at 658.
225. See Nathan Knutt, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal
Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 496 (2005) (noting that before the 1930s, compensation of
executives was not public material).
226. See id.
227. See generally Edward M. Iacobucci, The Effects of Disclosure on Executive
Compensation, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 489 (1998) (discussing the role of disclosure in affecting
how executives are paid and how much they are paid in light of the rise of institutional
investors).
228. See id. at 497–98. But see Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive
Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 399, 447 (1998) (arguing that more
disclosure increases monitoring costs because it overwhelms institutions with additional
materials beyond those needed to analyze compensation schemes).
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obtain material information.229 Second, mandatory disclosure encourages
compensation committees to devise compensation schemes that better align
with shareholder goals.230 When first adopting disclosure regulations, the
SEC believed that disclosure requirements would shame boards of directors
into doing the right thing for shareholders and employees.231 Today, by
requiring companies to not only disclose compensation levels but also to
explain why these levels are chosen, companies may revisit their
compensation practices not just to comply with regulations but to avoid
public pressure or embarrassment.232 Given their large size, disclosure
additionally allows institutional investors to deter management and generate
a reputation for scrutinizing excessive pay packages.233 Other benefits to
disclosure include allowing investors to make better investment decisions,
improving stock market accuracy, deterring fraud, and enhancing
accountability for boards and compensation committees.234 Regulators
recognized these benefits and thus, by the 1990s, aimed at making
disclosure clearer and easier for shareholders to understand and use.235
2. Disclosure Detriments and Ratcheting-up Problems
On the other edge of the sword is the belief that disclosure may in fact
result in higher levels of pay for executives.236 Various studies suggest that
the growth of executive compensation has increased beyond that which can
be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry
classification.237 From these studies emerged the proposition that enhanced
disclosure leads to compensation “ratcheting upwards,” as corporate boards
use disclosed compensation practices of other firms as a benchmark in
setting their own pay practices.238 Compensation committees use “peer
groups” when formulating compensation packages.239 Typically, these
committees believe that their CEO is at least above average, and want to

229. See Iacobucci, supra note 227, at 498.
230. See id. at 497–98.
231. See Markham, supra note 68, at 278. This goal remained the same when the SEC
amended its reforms in the 1990s. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 336.
232. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 344.
233. See Iacobucci, supra note 227, at 498–99 (discussing the potential for institutional
investors to be the solution to various corporate governance issues).
234. See Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479–80 (2007).
235. See supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text.
236. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 1264 (suggesting that disclosure may increase
executive pay).
237. See, e.g., Markham, supra note 68, at 287 (citing a study stating that mean
compensation in 2003 would have been roughly half of its actual size if compensation was
actually based on the firm size, performance, and industry classification).
238. See Walker, supra note 64, at 658; see also Simmons, supra note 2, at 343
(highlighting Walker’s argument that enhanced disclosure may lead to more opaque,
inefficient compensation practices).
239. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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pay their CEO at levels reflecting this conviction.240 When all boards strive
to compensate their CEOs at levels higher than their competitors, it leads to
an increase in pay across all markets.241 This creates inefficiencies for
regulators because it undermines the link between pay and performance by
allowing top executives to be paid at similarly high levels regardless of
corporate performance.242
D. Are We Using the Right Metric?
Assuming that disclosure can be beneficial, it is still apparent that
benefits will not be realized without disclosure of the “right” information.
The usefulness of a “pay ratio” to shareholders is therefore pivotal to the
CEO Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule’s success. Current SEC Chair Mary Jo
White stated, “To say that the views on the pay-ratio disclosure requirement
are divided is an obvious understatement.”243 Despite recognizing its high
compliance costs, the SEC has maintained that the pay ratio is a fitting
metric that will provide useful information to shareholders.244 Others
remain skeptical of both its reliability and impending practicality for
shareholders and potential investors.245 This section discusses arguments
proffered by both pay-ratio advocates and critics.
1. Pay-Ratio Advocates
Proponents of the pay ratio emphasize its ability to help investors
evaluate CEO pay levels when exercising voting rights on executive
compensation matters such as say-on-pay.246 Moreover, many suggest that
240. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 336 (“Typically, compensation committees would
want to pay their CEO at roughly the 75th percentile among comparable companies,
reflecting the fact that their CEO is (of course) above average.”).
241. See Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 916–17 (1992).
242. See Marino, supra note 52, at 1213; see also Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating:
The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1877 (1992) (noting
that regardless of performance, the “ratcheting effect” generates continuously higher levels
of pay).
243. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting on Security-Based Swap
Rules Under Title VII and on Pay Ratio Disclosure Rule (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-at-open-meeting-on-sbs-and-pay-ratiodisclosure.html [https://perma.cc/CM29-VX54].
244. See Pay Ratio Press Release, supra note 13. The SEC estimates first year
implementation costs to be $1.3 billion. See Timothy J. Bartl, Deep-Six the CEO Pay Ratio
Rule, CFO (Oct. 1, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/10/deep-six-ceo-payratio-rule/ [https://perma.cc/3JKG-ZDPS].
245. See generally Bartl, supra note 244 (opining that the pay-ratio produces a
misleading, immaterial disclosure that generates a tremendous financial burden on
companies).
246. See, e.g., Brandon J. Rees, AFL-CIO, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Require
Pay Ratio Disclosure (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713562.pdf (“Pay ratio disclosure will also help investors evaluate CEO pay levels when voting
on
executive
compensation
matters
such
as
‘say-on-pay’
resolutions.”)
[https://perma.cc/7KVP-KJCR]; Theresa Whitmarsh, State of Washington Investment Board,
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Require Pay Ratio Disclosure (Nov. 26, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-13/s70713-437.pdf (“Investors will be able to use
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the company-specific metric will allow greater insight into the health of
corporations, including the integrity of corporate leaders and the
disclosure’s effect on employee morale.247 As some have noted, high levels
of CEO pay relative to other workers can have a detrimental effect on
employee morale and productivity.248 Observing low morale may therefore
lead companies to alter their compensation structures in a positive way.249
Because the pay ratio is intended to be company specific, its advocates also
suggest that it will alleviate the “ratcheting up” of executive compensation
that resulted from other disclosure regulations.250 Rather than focusing on
horizontal comparisons among CEOs, the new metric allows shareholders
and investors to consider the vertical distribution of pay within their
particular firm.251
2. Pay-Ratio Critics
Critics assert that the pay ratio will not change investor practices
significantly, because most shareholders already have established methods
for determining what pay level they consider appropriate for CEOs.252
Since 2010, the fifteen shareholder resolutions advocating for a pay-ratio
method of disclosure received the support of less than 7 percent of
shareholders.253 Importantly, the SEC also may be inadvertently skewing
the calculation by using the ratio.254 For example, if Company A has five
employees earning $50,000 per year, they generate the same median salary
($50,000) as Company B, which includes two employees earning $10,000
and three employees earning $50,000. Assuming the compensation of the
CEO is the same in both companies, Company A and Company B will have
CEO-to-worker pay ratios as an additional metric in evaluating say-on-pay votes and other
executive compensation issues.”) [https://perma.cc/34ZK-W6GD].
247. See, e.g., Paul Schwarzbach, Allied Value, LLC, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule
to Require Pay Ratio Disclosure (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0713/s70713-298.pdf (“Pay ratios will be a useful tool for assessing the integrity of corporate
leadership, the viability of corporate incentive structures, and the likelihood of situations
deleterious to employee morale.”) [https://perma.cc/KNC8-2DN8].
248. See, e.g., Heather Slavkin Corzo, Pay Ratio Rule Gives Shareholders Better Exec
Comp Info, CFO (Oct. 1, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/10/pay-ratio-rulegives-shareholders-better-exec-comp-info/ [https://perma.cc/4LML-PRFX].
249. See id.
250. See, e.g., Americans for Financial Reform, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to
Require Pay Ratio Disclosure (Dec. 2, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-0713/s70713-505.pdf (“In enacting 953(b) and mandating the disclosure of the pay ratio as
well, Congress sought to address investor concerns that the old disclosure requirements
encouraged companies to focus on peer to peer comparisons when setting CEO pay, the
practice of which helped lead to increasingly higher levels of CEO pay.”)
[https://perma.cc/37HW-AB5Z].
251. See id.
252. See Steve Seelig, CEO Pay Ratio Opens Fair-Pay Debate to Everyone, CFO (Oct. 1,
2015),
http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/10/ceo-pay-ratio-opens-fair-pay-debateeveryone/ [https://perma.cc/2RE7-VRXK].
253. See Bartl, supra note 244.
254. See S. Kumar, The Big Flaw in the SEC’s CEO Pay-Ratio Rule, FORTUNE (Aug. 6,
2015, 2:06 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/06/sec-ceo-pay-ratio-inequality/ [https://
perma.cc/4E5Y-RWFK].
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the same pay ratio, even though Company B has a less equal pay
structure.255 Accordingly, the use of a weighted average256 in computing
the pay of average employees may prove beneficial because it accounts for
how many workers get paid at different levels within the company and
limits the impact of outliers.257
Critics further maintain that the ratio is a “silly” or “misleading”
calculation because it does not provide investors with useful comparable
data.258 For example, a domestic corporation may have a better ratio than a
multinational company due to legal, currency, or cost-of-living
differences.259 The inclusion of part-time and seasonal workers also raises
concerns about ratio accuracy because some industries require more parttime, hourly paid workers than other industries.260 A company in the retail
outlet industry may have a higher ratio than a bank, which requires less
part-time, hourly paid workers.261 The ratio thus might not reflect these
differences and could potentially mislead shareholders and investors about a
company’s health.262
Lastly, critics discredit the notion that the ratcheting-up problem will be
alleviated through the pay ratio.263 Although more weight is given to the
vertical distribution of pay, nothing inhibits boards and compensation
committees from using the pay ratios of competitors as a benchmark when
crafting compensation packages.264 Companies may potentially increase
CEO pay to elevate their pay ratios to levels similar to their competitors.
This would create a broad increase in compensation across all industries in
a manner similar to that observed following previous disclosure
regulations.265

255. For a similar hypothetical, see id.
256. A weighted average is that “in which each quantity to be averaged is assigned a
weight, and these weightings determine the relative importance of each quantity on the
average.” Weighted Average, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/
weightedaverage.asp?optm=sa_v2 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/8ABL9FEP].
257. See Seelig, supra note 252.
258. See David McCann, CEO Pay Ratio Rule Rankles Both Sides of Heated Debate,
CFO (Aug. 5, 2015), http://ww2.cfo.com/compensation/2015/08/ceo-pay-ratio-rule-ranklessides-heated-debate/ [https://perma.cc/2YP6-KZUY].
259. See Allen Smith, SEC Pay-Ratio Rule Spotlights CEO Compensation, SOC’Y HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/legalissues/federalresources/
pages/sec-pay-ratio-rule.aspx [https://perma.cc/T8V8-ESYT].
260. See McCann, supra note 258.
261. See IKE BRANNON, CTR. CAP. MKTS., THE EGREGIOUS COSTS OF THE SEC’S PAYRATIO DISCLOSURE REGULATION (2014), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/Egregious-Cost-of-Pay-Ratio-5.14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YQE2YT45].
262. See id.
263. See Michael S. Piwowar, Comm’r, SEC, Additional Dissenting Comments on Pay
Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/additional-dissentingstatement-on-pay-ratio-disclosure.html#_ftn65 [https://perma.cc/A6GY-AGUW].
264. See Miller, supra note 122 (citing reports predicting that CEOs and boards will use
low pay ratios as an argument for raising CEO pay).
265. See id.
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III. CEO PAY RATIO DISCLOSURE RULE MODIFICATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR COMPROMISE
Regardless of the various schisms and uncertainties that exist within the
executive compensation debate, one thing is universally recognized:
executive compensation has contributed to the income inequality gap in this
country and attempts to curb it have been futile to date. The efficacy of any
mandatory disclosure regulation depends on two vital factors: (1) whether
companies are disclosing the right information to shareholders and, if they
are, (2) whether proper mechanisms exist to allow them to effectuate
meaningful change. The future implications for the CEO Pay Ratio
Disclosure Rule are no exception. Part III.A proposes altering the median
employee calculation to a weighted average approach and calls for two
additional calculations to be disclosed in conjunction with the modified pay
ratio: the percent change of the modified pay ratio from the previous year
and the percent change in company profits from the previous year. Part
III.B proposes the adoption of quasi-mandatory say-on-pay votes that are
triggered when company pay practices are detrimentally uncorrelated with
performance.
A. New and Improved Pay Ratio
Given the limited success of past disclosure reforms, the use of a pay
ratio represents an innovative attempt by the SEC to depict a company’s
pay practices and health through a single metric. Nevertheless, various
alterations to the ratio may enhance its efficiency and usefulness for
shareholders and investors. First, the use of a weighted average should be
used when calculating the average compensation of other workers besides
the CEO.266 Furthermore, two numerical calculations should be disclosed
in conjunction with this modified pay ratio: (1) the percent change of the
pay ratio from the previous year and (2) the percent change of company
profits from the previous year.
1. Pay-Ratio Shortcoming
and Weighted Average Implementation
Employing a weighted average approach, rather than a median
calculation, better describes a company’s pay structure and inhibits ratio
manipulation. The weighted average provides enhanced accuracy because
it gives greater weight to common compensation levels.267 For example, if
Company A employs 101 workers, fifty of whom earn $100,000, and fifty
one of whom earn $50,000, the median calculation would equal $50,000.
This value does not demonstrate that Company A pays roughly half of its
employees at a level greater than the median. Under a weighted average
approach, this calculation would equal approximately $74,750, which better
exemplifies Company A’s pay structure.
266. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, a weighted average approach better safeguards against ratio
manipulation that would be inconsistent with the goals of the regulation.
Under the median calculation, a company has a greater capability of
improving its pay ratio without altering CEO pay at all. In the example
above, if Company A hired only two additional workers at a salary of
$100,000, the median calculation would double to $100,000. Although this
would lower its pay ratio, it would not provide the intended results of the
current regulation and would mislead shareholders.
Applying this
manipulative tactic under a weighted average approach would not alter the
ratio in a profound way, as the new weighted average would rise slightly, to
approximately $75,240. Because companies will be unable to hire new
workers or modify the compensation of a few current workers to profoundly
alter their pay ratios, reducing CEO compensation becomes the most
practical tactic.
Lastly, the use of a weighted average assuages concerns accompanying
the Rule’s inclusion of part-time and seasonal workers in the employee
population.268 These workers typically earn lower wages than full-time
employees. Under the current Rule, their inclusion may lower the median
compensation for all other employees besides the CEO in a way that does
not accurately reflect a company’s pay structure. Conversely, their
inclusion under a weighted average calculation is marginalized because
there are usually substantially fewer part-time workers as compared to fulltime employees. This provides a greater incentive for companies to hire
more of these workers without fear that doing so might negatively affect
their pay ratios.
2. Percent-Change Disclosure Benefits
Requiring companies to disclose the percent changes proposed may
present shareholders with a better picture of a company’s health and
facilitate shareholder activism in the process. Shareholders and investors
are given greater insight into how a company’s compensation structure is
changing in relation to performance. This allows them to better determine
whether pay levels crafted by the board are justified. For example,
shareholders observing a growing pay ratio in conjunction with decreasing
company profits may be more skeptical of board decisions. Greater
emphasis is therefore placed on the board’s CD&A to justify why pay
levels should be at certain levels. Without understanding compensation
levels in relation to performance, shareholders may be inclined to simply
defer to the explanations provided by the board.
Including percent changes may additionally generate increased
shareholder activism because it gives shareholders and investors insight into
the future stability and growth of a company. Most shareholders are
concerned with long-term policies and company value.269 Long-term
shareholders who observe a period of declining profits in conjunction with
268. See supra notes 260–62 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text.
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higher pay ratios may be more inclined to actively lobby for executive pay
alterations that provide long-term benefits to the company.
B. Quasi-Mandatory Voting
and Shareholder-Director Balance
Part III.B.1 proposes the adoption of quasi-mandatory say-on-pay votes.
Then, Part III.B.2 discusses the proposal’s ability to aid shareholders in
influencing executive compensation without disrupting the necessary
powers of the board of directors.
1. Annual Quasi-Mandatory Say-on-Pay
Regulators have continuously and unsuccessfully attempted to link pay to
performance by using incentives, specifically in the form of stock grants
and options.270 To date, these incentives had been targeted solely at
management and executives in an effort to get them to make decisions that
maximize shareholder wealth.271 Nevertheless, it is now time to return the
favor to shareholders by incentivizing them to become influential actors in
fighting high executive compensation levels. To promote greater activism,
say-on-pay votes should occur annually, rather than the current scheme that
allows shareholders to decide whether they should occur annually, every
two years, or every three years. This eliminates the possibility that
companies will compensate their CEOs and top executives higher in years
with no shareholder vote.
The ideal scenario for shareholders and the public involves two different
trends: (1) the change in profits is increasing at a higher rate than the
change in the proposed pay ratio or (2) the change in profits is decreasing at
a lower rate than the change in the proposed pay ratio. Shareholder votes
should continue to remain advisory when these situations occur. However,
shareholder votes should carry more weight when two alternative,
unfavorable conditions exist: (1) the change in profits is increasing at a
lower rate than the change in the proposed pay ratio or (2) the change in
profits is decreasing faster than the change in the proposed pay ratio. When
either of these criteria are met, if 50 percent of shareholders vote with
disapproval for the compensation of their CEO, the CEO is subject to a
clawback provision that requires him or her to return the amount of pay
necessary to equate the change in the ratio with the change in profits. For
example, if Company A’s pay ratio increases by 10 percent but company
profits only increase by 5 percent, if the majority of shareholders vote with
disapproval as to the CEO’s salary, he or she would be required to return
pay until the percent change in the ratio reached 5 percent as well.

270. For a discussion on the emergence and results of incentive-based compensation, see
supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part II.A.
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2. Shareholder-Director Balance
This proposal creates a compensation-setting process that properly
balances the dual interests of both shareholder and director primacists. Part
III.B.2.a discusses the proposal’s adherence to director primacy views while
Part III.B.2.b analyzes its ability to effectively aid shareholders and assuage
various concerns past regulations failed to rectify.
a. Director Power Preservation
Corporations involve many contributing constituents including
shareholders, creditors, directors, and executives, each of whom strives to
maximize their individual utility.272 The modern corporation necessitates
an isolated decision-making body capable of balancing these interests.273
The board is in the best position to do so because it is composed of
independent directors who can objectively make decisions for the
betterment of the corporation as a whole. Conforming to these views, this
proposal affirms the necessary powers of the board to manage the business
and affairs of the corporation in accordance with section 141 of the
Delaware Code. Directors and committees retain the ability to craft
compensation packages as they see fit. Shareholders remain uninvolved in
the compensation-setting process and lack any power to usurp board
decisions in favor of their own. Their ability to influence CEO
compensation is only triggered under unique circumstances and when
enough shareholders disapprove of the CEO’s compensation. Even when
these requirements are satisfied, shareholders will still be unable to exert
any decision-making power because the amount of compensation a CEO
would forfeit in a clawback is automatically determined. CEOs would be
required to return the amount needed to equate the two percent changes
regardless of what shareholders believe should be the appropriate
compensation level. These alterations therefore do not compromise the
board’s ability to carry out its decision-making functions nor do they
provide shareholders with any power to substitute the board’s decisions for
their own.
Additionally, board of director independence from managerial influence
may be strengthened. The existence of the shareholder vote creates an
additional disincentive for boards to succumb to the desires of powerful
managers.274 Awarding a CEO with the compensation he or she desires
may alter the ratio in a way that triggers the mandatory shareholder vote.
This may generate both public and shareholder criticism and increase
potential outrage costs. If shareholders obtain the majority votes needed for
the clawback to apply, these directors will be scrutinized even further.

272. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
273. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
274. For a discussion of managers’ ability to influence the board’s pay decisions, see
supra notes 145–50 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, the directors may not be willing to confront the heightened
potential risks associated with yielding to management’s desires.
b. Shareholders’ Enhanced Rights and Solutions
Without altering the board’s decision-making functions, this proposal
affords shareholders a mechanism to effectuate meaningful change on
executive compensation issues in a way hindered by the current structure.
Excessive executive pay has deleterious effects on individuals, companies,
and the national economy.275 These harmful consequences necessitate a
way for shareholders to hold boards accountable for suboptimal
compensation decisions. Yet unlike other major corporate decisions that
are halted by a majority shareholder veto, no such mechanism currently
exists in the compensation-setting process.276 Although say-on-pay votes
offer shareholders greater rights than previously held, their advisory status
still marginalizes their impact and creates little incentive for shareholders to
be active. Providing shareholders with quasi-mandatory say-on-pay votes
allows them greater influence in situations where CEO pay may be
unjustifiably high to the detriment of various corporate constituents.
Although they still lack decision-making power, expanded voting power
provides them with an accountability device similar to a shareholder veto of
other major corporate decisions. Their ability to influence CEO pay
furthermore incentivizes them to take an active role in the manner intended
by the SEC.
Providing shareholders with more “skin in the game” additionally
enhances shareholder activism by alleviating both collective action and
rational apathy problems. Because shareholder votes may be pivotal in
influencing CEO pay, shareholders will have more of an incentive to
coordinate and oppose compensation packages that they disapprove.
Moreover, it assuages the ratcheting up of compensation that accompanied
previous disclosure regulations. Boards will be inhibited from using
compensation packages of peer groups as a benchmark because similar
companies have different structures and profits from year to year. If boards
decide to raise the compensation of their CEOs to that of their competitors,
not only will they confront higher public and shareholder scrutiny than ever
before, but doing so may increase the pay ratio to a level that triggers the
shareholder accountability mechanism.

275. See supra Part I.B.
276. See supra Part I.A.

